DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF GILPIN, STATE OF COLORADO Case No. 96 CR 91 Division 1 Filed in Combined Court Feb. 10., 1997 ORDER THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO Plaintiff, v. Laura J. Kriho, Defendant THIS MATTER came before this Court on October 1 and 2, 1996, for trial to the Court on issues raised in the District Attorney\\\'s Motion of Contempt Citation. The People were represented by Deputy District Attorney James Stanley, and Ms. Kriho was represented by Paul Grant. This Court, having heard the evidence and arguments of counsel and having reviewed the legal briefs of counsel filed on October 9, 1996, and being advised in the premises, enters the following findings and order. This action arose out of jury selection during the trial of _People v. Michelle Brannon_, Gilpin County District Court case number 95 CR 74, which occurred on May 13, 1996. A juror serving on the _Brannon_ case, Laura J. Kriho, was cited with contempt of court for her conduct during the jury selection process. After the contempt citation was issued, the trial judge in the _Brannon_ case, Judge Kenneth Barnhill, disqualified himself from further participation and Ms. Kriho\\\'s contempt case was assigned to this judge for trial. The District Attorney asserts that Ms. Kriho is in contempt of court for disobeying an order of the trial court, obstruction the administration of justice, and committing perjury. The District Attorney alleges that Laura Kriho, while serving as a juror: 1) failed to reveal that she had previously been arrested, charged with, and pled guilty to a felony charge of Possession of a Scheduled I Controlled Substance and was thereafter granted a deferred judgment and sentence; 2) failed to reveal that she was opposed to the enforcement of drug laws through the courts and that she was actively involved in an organization which had as its purpose the modification of certain Colorado drug laws; and 3) failed to reveal that she did not intend to follow the judge\\\'s instructions on the law. The District Attorney argues that Ms. Kriho did these things with the intent to obstruct justice. Ms. Kriho, through her counsel, has mischaracterized the issues in this case. This case is not now and has never been about how Ms. Kriho voted during jury deliberations. This case is about whether Ms. Kriho misled the trial court and the trial attorneys about important matters during the jury selection process with the intent to remain on the jury and obstruct the legal process. The Court admitted evidence of Ms. Kriho\\\'s conduct during deliberations only as it was relevant to the issue of Ms. Kriho\\\'s conduct during the jury selection process. This mischaracterization of the case has made it more difficult to focus upon the real issue: Ms. Kriho\\\'s conduct during jury _selection_, not jury _deliberation_. JURY NULLIFICATION No juror can be punished for their vote in deciding a case. Even if the juror\\\'s vote amounts to jury nullification and flies in the face of the evidence and the law, they cannot be punished in any way. However, if a juror deliberately misleads the court and the attorneys during jury selection with the intent to obstruct the legal process, it is a totally different situation. Here, the District Attorney seeks a finding of contempt for Ms. Kriho\\\'s alleged failure to reveal important information during voir dire. The District Attorney is not seeking to punish Ms. Kriho for her refusal to vote in favor of a conviction during jury deliberations. This case presents a delicate and sensitive issue because it can easily be misinterpreted. The laws of this state do not permit lawyers and judges to criticize jurors for their decisions in a case, much less punish them. Ms. Kriho has attempted to focus the case on a juror\\\'s \\\"right\\\" to vote without regard for the instructions of law give by trial court and has forcefully argued in favor of a \\\"right\\\" to jury nullification. The term \\\"jury nullification\\\" refers to the power of a juror to decide a case in a way that is contrary to the evidence and the law. The United States Supreme Court, in _Sparf v. United States_, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), held that it is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury on the law. In that case the court stated: Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves. Under such a system, the principle function of the judge would be to preside and keep order while jurymen, untrained in the law, would determine questions affecting life, liberty or property according to such legal principles as, in their judgment, were applicable to the particular case being tried... We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United States it is the duty of jurors in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence. _Sparf_, 156 U.S. 51 at 101-102. There is no question that jurors possess the power referred to as jury nullification, but juries should not be encouraged to use such power indiscriminately. In _United States v. Moylan_, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969), _cert. denied_, 397 U.S. 910 (1970), the United States Court of Appeals stated: No less an authority than Dean Pound has expressed the opinion that \\\'Jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration.\\\' However, this is not to say that the jury should be encouraged in their \\\'lawlessness\\\', and by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or conscience (for there is no check to insure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. These opinions hold that while jurors have a duty to follow the court\\\'s statement of the law, they still have the ability, although not the right, to disregard the law in reaching their decision. Defendant takes a strong position in favor jury nullification arguing that such a right is necessary for juries to oppose a tyrannical government. Defendant refers to historic cases in which jury nullification has had an important impact on civil liberties. While this is unquestionably true, it is also unquestionably true that jury nullification can lead to the tyrannical application of the law. If the jury can, as a matter of right, acquit in the face of contrary evidence and law, could they not also convict flying in the face of evidence and law? A system which allows jurors, as a matter of right, to pick and choose among the rules of law which they will apply, has extremely dangerous implications, particularly to those who may espouse unpopular causes or who, for other reasons, are not looked upon favorably by the majority in the community. It is one thing to laude the efforts of a jury fairly picked and honestly chosen to decide a case in conformity with their conscience. It is quite another thing for a juror to deliberately mislead the court in an effort to obstruct the administration of justice. FINDINGS OF FACT From the evidence in the case this Court makes the following factual findings. Ms. Kriho was summoned to jury duty in the case of _People v. Brannon_, Gilpin County District Court case number 95 CR 74. Ms. Kriho reported for jury duty on May 13, 1996. She and all jurors were given an oath by the trial court to truthfully answer questions concerning their ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors. The charges in the case were read to the jurors so all jurors were aware that it was a criminal trial involving alleged violations of drug laws. The trial court advised all of the jury panel, including those in the gallery, that it was important for everyone to listen to the questions of the trial court and the lawyers because it was possible that jurors in the gallery would be called forward to replace jurors in the box. From the testimony of the jurors who served with Ms. Kriho on the _Brannon_ case and from the testimony of Ms. Kriho herself, it is clear that all potential jurors, including those in the box and those in the gallery, understood the need to listen closely to the questioning of all jurors. Every replacement juror called was asked if they had heard the prior questions and they were given an opportunity to comment on any of the topics discussed. Ms. Kriho testified that she was able to hear all of the court proceedings from her place in the courtroom. Because it was stated clearly by the judge during his voir dire, and the other jurors who testified clearly understood the need to volunteer information, and because the question was asked repeatedly to all replacement jurors, this Court finds that Ms. Kriho was aware of the prior questioning and she was given an opportunity to comment on the topics discussed. Several consistent topics were discussed with many jurors, including discussions of the jurors\\\' obligation to follow the law as given by the trial court, discussions of drug usage and drug laws and how such experiences might affect the jurors\\\' ability to serve fairly and impartially. To a lesser extent, the fact that punishment was not within the province of the jury was also discussed. Discussion of a juror\\\'s duty to follow the law as given by the trial court, and any issues relating to enforcement of the drug laws, was repeated so many times during voir dire, that this Court must conclude that all jurors, including Ms. Kriho, were aware that these were important issues and that prospective jurors should have revealed any opinions or strong feelings on these topics. The following quotations from the transcript of the jury voir dire illustrate how clearly Judge Barnhill explained the issue of jurors following the trial court\\\'s instructions on the law. (Questions by Judge Barnhill.) Would all of you agree to follow my instructions on the law even if you don\\\'t agree with them or you don\\\'t think that they are what the law is or should be? People sometimes have a little different attitude about what the law should be than what it really is. What I need from you is a commitment that you will follow my instructions even if you don\\\'t agree with them. And you all agree to do that? Follow the instructions on the law? My job is to tell you what the law is, and will you all agree to follow my instructions? Will you all agree? Anyone saying no? (pages 17 and 18) (Question by Judge Barnhill.) What I need to have from you is a commitment that you will follow my instructions on the law in this case and not try to remember any of the instructions that you received in the earlier case. Will you all agree to that? (page 24) The testimony of several jurors indicated that at various times during jury deliberations they brought to Ms. Kriho\\\'s attention the trial court\\\'s instruction that they were to follow the law even if they disagreed with it. From that testimony, this Court concludes that the voir dire made a distinct impression on the jurors of their duty to follow the law. Ms. Kriho knew this was an important consideration for the judge and the lawyers and yet she chose not to reveal her strong feelings about this. The following quotation from the jury voir dire transcript reveal the obvious emphasis during voir dire concerning any strong feelings about drug laws. (Question by Mr. Stanley) Let me ask about -- does anyone have any particular strong feelings, either pro or con, about the laws we have including the law that will apply here that you will get from His Honor, Judge Barnhill, about the control of dangerous drugs or controlled substances? In other words, it is against the law to possess methamphetamine and that is why we\\\'re here. Does anybody have any particular views about these laws including specifically this one? (Pages 41 and 42). Several different times during voir dire the judge, the District Attorney and Ms. Brannon\\\'s attorney, discussed issues relating to drugs with several different jurors. This Court finds that Ms. Kriho was aware that any experiences, or strong opinions she had concerning the drug laws were important issues in selecting the jury. The evidence shows that on April 29, 1985, in Boulder County District Court, Ms. Kriho had pled guilty to the felony crime of Possession of a Schedule I Controlled Substance and was granted a deferred judgment and sentence. The evidence further shows that Ms. Kriho holds strong opinions about the propriety of certain drug laws. She is a founder and activist in an organization called the Boulder Hemp Initiative Project, which has the goal of legalizing marijuana in Colorado. She failed to reveal any of this highly relevant information during the jury selection process. On the issue of punishment, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury in the final written jury instructions. If you decide that the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the crimes as charged, it will be my job to decide what the punishment will be. You should not try to guess what the punishment might be. It would not enter into you consideration at any time. Based on this instruction and the comments by the trial court and counsel during voir dire, this Court concludes that all of the jurors, including Ms. Kriho, were aware that punishment was not to be considered by the jury in finding the defendant guilty or not guilty. The testimony of other jurors revealed that this prohibition was called to the attention of Ms. Kriho during jury deliberations. The evidence further revealed that during jury deliberations Ms. Kriho attempted to discover what the punishment for the crime of Possession of Methamphetamines would be. She investigated this in the evening between the first and second days of trial and told her fellow jurors what she though the punishment would be based upon information she obtained from the internet. The information she conveyed to the jury was inaccurate. Testimony of Ms. Kriho\\\'s fellow jurors revealed that she informed these jurors that she did not believe drug laws should be enforced through the courts and she discussed her belief that jurors did not have to follow the law if they did not agree with it. During the course of deliberations it came to the judge\\\'s attention that a juror had researched the question of punishment on the internet and had brought that information to the attention of other jurors. The defendant in the underlying trial, Michelle Brannon, moved for a mistrial and that request was granted by the trial court. The jury was then discharged. Outside the courthouse Ms. Kriho produced a jury nullification brochure from her purse and gave it to one of her fellow jurors. Ms. Kriho admitted in her testimony that she brought this brochure to the courthouse with her. This brochure promotes the concept that jurors should be permitted to judge the merits of the law as well as the facts in a case. It further promotes the concept of jurors disregarding the law if they do not agree with it. These are the same concepts Ms. Kriho was espousing in the jury room. On the back of this brochure the following is printed: \\\"For more information contact the: Boulder Hemp Initiative Project.\\\" The brochure then provides the address and telephone number for that organization. Ms. Kriho testified that she was not a member of or an activist for the organization that published the brochure. However, Ms. Kriho also testified that she was very active in the Boulder Hemp Initiative Project which according to the brochure will provide more information concerning the jury nullification organization. The Court finds that Ms. Kriho does have some relationship with the organization that published the brochure and she knew this was important to the selection of a fair and impartial jury. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Thankfully, contempt citations against jurors are quite rare. However, they are not unprecedented. See _Clark v. United States_, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (United States Supreme Court affirmed judgment finding juror in contempt of court for giving knowingly misleading and knowingly false answers in response to questions concerning her qualifications as a juror during jury selection process); _In re Mossie_, 768 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1985) (trial court finding that juror was under duty to disclose prior offenses on voir dire examination and intentional failure to respond to court\\\'s voir dire questions constituted contempt reversed by appellate court, which held that because juror only pled guilty to marihuana possession and because marijuana possession was not a crime in Missouri, juror did not falsely answer voir dire question regarding whether or not she had been convicted of a crime); _In the Matter of the Application to a Judge Herbert Borgdon in Criminal Contempt_, 625 F. Supp. 422 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (evidence of juror\\\'s willful and deliberate failure to disclose previous knowledge of case during voir dire was sufficient to permit the privilege concerning jury deliberations to fall and was sufficient to support conviction); _Bays v. Petan Company of Nevada, Inc._, 94 F.R.D. 587 (D. Nev. 1982) (failure to respond truthfully during voir dire could not form basis for holding juror in contempt in the absence of evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully and knowingly gave false evidence during voir dire, and the juror\\\'s failure to follow instructions during deliberations could not constitute contempt in absence of a showing of knowing and willful concealment or false swearing); _United States v. Lampkin_, 66 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Fla. 1946) (juror found to be in contempt when juror failed to reveal prior criminal record during jury selection process). The _Clark_ case, cited above, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1933, with an opinion written by Justice Cardozo, affirmed a finding of contempt against a juror for knowingly giving misleading and false responses to questions effecting her qualifications as a juror with the intent to obstruct justice. Justice Cardozo stated that \\\"(c)oncealment or misstatement by a juror upon a voir dire examination is punishable as contempt if its tendency and design are to obstruct the processes of justice.\\\" _Clark_ 289 U.S. at 10. The opinion clearly points out that a juror found to be in contempt is not punished for the act of concealment or the act of false swearing, but is punished for using the false swearing or concealment of obstruct the course of justice. The case goes on to hold that testimony concerning the conduct of a juror during deliberations does not violate the rule that jurors may not be questioned concerning their processes of deliberations, if evidence other than the jury deliberation provides a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that the juror has willfully concealed or withheld information with the intent to obstruct justice. In Kriho\\\'s case the Court finds such a prima facie case exists based on the following evidence: (1) the question the jurors sent to the judge indicated that a particular juror did not think drug cases belonged in the courts and had introduced information concerning punishment; (2) Ms. Kriho produced a jury nullification brochure immediately following the declaration of mistrial and gave it to a fellow juror; 3) this fellow juror presented the brochure to Judge Barnhill and stated that this brochure explained the reason for the mistrial. Under these circumstances, the evidence concerning Ms. Kriho\\\'s conduct during jury deliberations was merely confirmation of the prima facie case established by other evidence. After reviewing all the evidence and the law, and applying the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court reaches the following conclusions. During the jury selection process Ms. Kriho was aware that the trial court and the lawyers felt it was a juror\\\'s duty to follow the law as given by the trial court, and they wanted to know if any juror disagreed with this proposition. Ms. Kriho was also aware that the trial court and the parties wanted to know if the jurors could follow the rule that punishment was not to enter into their deliberations. Ms. Kriho was also aware that the trial court and the parties wanted to know if the jurors could follow the rule that punishment was not to enter into their deliberations. Ms. Kriho was also aware that the trial court and the parties wanted to know if any juror had strong feelings concerning the enforcement of drug laws or any experience that would affect their attitude about drug laws. While being aware of the importance of these issues and having been given the opportunity to comment on these issues, Ms. Kriho deliberately withheld her opinions on these topics from the trial court and the parties during the jury selection process. Based on all the evidence, this Court concludes that it was Ms. Kriho\\\'s intent to withhold this information from the trial court and the parties so that she could be selected to serve on the jury and obstruct the judicial process. By deliberately withholding this information, she obstructed the process of selecting a fair and impartial jury. The selection of jurors who have open minds and who have not preconceived the verdict is essential for a fair trial. Ms. Kriho\\\'s lack of candor about her experiences and attitudes led to the selection of a jury doomed to mistrial from the start. This Court finds this conduct constitutes obstruction of justice and this conduct was offensive to the authority and dignity of the trial court. On the issue of disobedience to an order of the trial court, this Court finds in favor of Ms. Kriho and against the People. Instructions on the law given to a jury at the conclusion of a trial are not orders of the court which, if violated by a juror, can result in a finding of contempt. No evidence of the trial court\\\'s orders to the jury was introduced by the People. Orders given to jury concerning their conduct during the course of a trial are court orders and might support a finding of contempt if there was evidence that such an order was given and it was deliberately violated. Such directions are ordinarily given to a jury during trial. They include an admonition that jurors are not to attempt to gather any information concerning the case outside of the courtroom. This direction relating to juror conduct is usually given after the jury is sworn and before opening statements are made. The transcript of that portion of the trial was not introduced into evidence in this contempt hearing and therefore this Court must conclude that the People have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Kriho violated an order of the trial court. On the issue of Ms. Kriho committing perjury, this Court finds in favor of Ms. Kriho and against the People. The case of _Murer v. Rogowski_, 480 P.2d 853 (Colo. App. 1971) sets forth specific conditions under which perjury can constitute contempt of court. The evidence in this case does not meet those conditions. The absence of those conditions did not deprive the District Attorney of all remedies. The District Attorney could have filed a criminal charge against Ms. Kriho for perjury if he had chosen to do so. THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that, based upon this Court\\\'s finding that Ms. Kriho deliberately and willfully withheld and concealed information which was relevant and important to selecting a fair and impartial jury, and that Ms. Kriho did so with the intent of serving on the jury for the purpose of obstructing justice, the Court finds Ms. Kriho in Contempt of Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Deputy District Attorney and counsel for Defendant shall immediately contact the Division Clerk to clear a date for a hearing at which time the Court shall consider the issue of imposition of sanctions. Done in Chambers this 10th day of February, 1997 BY THE COURT: Henry E. Nieto District Judge